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Homicide: The statutory requirement that a killing be "willful;
deliberate, malicious, and premeditated"1 for a finding of murder in
the first degree is not applicable to a killing committed while in the
perpetration of one of the felonies listed in the statute. This question
arose in Farmer v. State,2 in which it appeared that the killing re-
sulted from the setting on fire of a dwelling, i.e., arson, by the defend-
ant. It was urged on appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court that
there was no proof of felonious homicide because there was no showing
of anintent to kill nor even that the defendant had knowledge of the
existence of the victim, a two and one-half year old child. The court
was not impressed with this argument, however, and stated that
where a causal connection between one of the felonies listed in the
statute and the death is shown, no proof of intent to kill or malice
toward the victim is necessary. This of course follows the development
of the felony-murder rule 3
The effect of voluntary intoxication as negativing an intent to kill
was involved in Gibbs v. Stat.e, 4 another homicide case. The defendant
in that case was tried for the third, chronologically, of a series of four
killings and convicted of first degree murder. One of the contentions
urged on appeal, although apparently rather diffidently, was that the
killing was the product of the voluntary intoxication of the defendant
and therefore not murder. Treated as a question of proof in this case,
as the court apparently did, there seems to be no doubt that the de-
fendant's contention was baseless. However, the court states that the
fact that the defendant, although possibly intoxicated, "went out with
a loaded rifle" and killed the victim, together with three other persons,
makes the killing "murder" regardless of a lack of intent to kill on
the part of the defendant, citing Rogers v. State.5 The Rogers case was,
a conviction for second degree murder which occurred through the
defendant's operation of his automobile at a high rate of speed on the
wrong side of the highway while he was voluntarily intoxicated. There
the court held that the malice necessary for a conviction of murde
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Member, Alabama
Bar.
1. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 39-2402 (1956).
2. 296 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. 1956).
3. See PERaINs, CRIMINAL LAW 33-36 (1957).
4. 300 S.W.2d 890 (Tenn. 1957).
5. 196 Tenn. 263, 265 S.W.2d 559 (1954).
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arose from wilfully and knowingly acting in such a manner as seri-
ously to endanger life, and that voluntarily becoming intoxicated did
not deprive the act of such wilfulness or knowledge.6 The present
case, however, involving the additional factor of premeditation, might
better have called forth such a factually similar case as, for example,
Mullendore v. State,7 in which the court, speaking of the effect of
voluntary intoxication on the degree of homicide, stated:
Drunkenness, wilfully induced, to be effective to reduce a murder from
first to second degree, must be so complete that at the actual moment of
the commission of the crime the defendant's senses are so stupified by
drink that he is incapable of forming a premeditated and deliberate design
to kill.
A conviction of second degree murder in Whitsett v. State8 was
reduced by the Supreme Court to voluntary manslaughter on the
grounds that the killing in question occurred during the heat of pas-
sion aroused by adequate provocation. This was the classic case of
the killing of the wife's paramour by the "wronged" husband. The
killing occurred several months after the husband was first put on
notice of the cuckoldry. The court was able to find, however, that
fresh fuel was added to the husband's passion by a third person
through the confirmation to the defendant, about an hour before the
killing, of the illicit acts of the deceased.
Although the defendant appeared to act rationally for that hour, he
reacted with savage suddenness when he then encountered the de-
ceased by chance. After a short motorized chase, he killed the deceased
with a shotgun he happened to have in his car. On these facts it was
*found that not only was the provocation adequate but also the sudden
heat of passion aroused met the objective test.
Rape: Section 39-603 of the Tennessee Code Annotated provides
punishment for an assault with intent to commit a felony and for an
attempt to commit a felony where the punishment is not otherwise pre-
scribed; section 39-604 covers an assault and battery with intent to
rape; section 40-2520 authorizes, under an indictment for an offense,
a conviction of any lesser included offense or of an attempt to commit
the offense. These statutes were involved in Jones v. State 9 in which
the defendant was convicted of an attempt to commit a felony under
a charge of rape. He contended on appeal that, since the proof indi-
cated that an act of sexual intercourse had actually been accomplished
with the consent of the prosecutrix, he could not be convicted of the
6. See the comment on this case in Ball. Criminal Law and Procedure-
1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. REV. 825, 826 (1954).
7. 183 Tenn. 53, 60, 191 S.W.2d 149, 151 (1945).
8. 299 S.W.2d 2 (Tenn. 1957).
9. 292 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. 1956).
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attempt. The common law doctrine of merger of offenses, under which
there could usually be no conviction for an attempt where the offense
was actually committed, has been, as the court indicates, practically
abolished by section 40-2520 of the Code.10 Also, as section 39-605 does
not prescribe punishment for an attempt to commit rape without the
assault and battery, section 39-603 was the proper statute in this case
since consent obviated the commission of a battery.
Robbery: The question of what constitutes a "deadly weapon" in the
commission of the offense of robbery under section 39-3901 of the
Tennessee Code Annotated" was considered in Cooper v. State2 and
Turner v. State.13 In the Cooper case the Supreme Court held that a
toy pistol does not come within the statutory term of "deadly weapon";
in the Turner case it held that a "sawed-off shotgun" is a "deadly
weapon" regardless of its being unloaded at the time of the robbery.
The distinction the court draws is not in the degree of apprehension
engendered in the victim, which the court points out is the gravamen
of the common law offense of robbery and therefore not affected by the
amendment of the statute, but in the increased likelihood of harm re-
sulting from the use of a genuine weapon, although unloaded. That
all courts are not of one mind as to the definition of "deadly" in such
a statute is pointed out in the present opinion. Defining "deadly," as
these cases appear to do, by judicial fiat as "capable of being ren-
dered deadly" seems to be a pragmatic solution to a difficult problem.
It certainly seems likely that more serious harm could result from use
of a genuine, though not then loaded, firearm than from the use of
the most realistic appearing toy.
Assault and Battery: A single act directed at two or more persons
may constitute only one crime. Thus, in Huffman v. State14 the in-
tentional ramming of an automobile with more than one occupant is
a single assault and battery.
Liquor Offenses: In Muzzall v. State15 it was held that the unlawful
possession of intoxicating liquors 16 is a continuing offense so that there
may be a subsequent conviction for such possession of a cache of
liauor which remained undiscovered in a previous raid which had it-
self resulted in a conviction for unlawful possession. In Hall v. State1 7
it was reiterated that the presumption that property in the form of
10. Grindstaff v. State, 172 Tenn. 77. 110 S.W.2d 309 (1937); Heaton v. State,
130 Tenn. 163, 169 S.W. 750 (1914). See also PERKINS, CRIMIAL LAW 477-81
(1957).
11. This section was amended by Tenn. Pub. Acts 1955, c. 72, so as to make
robbery "accomplished by the use of a deadly weapon" a capital offense.
12. 297 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. 1956).
13. 300 S.W.2d 920 (Tenn. 1957).
14. 292 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1956).
15. 290 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1956).
16. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2507 (1956).
17. 292 S.W.2d 716 (Tenn. 1956).
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illegal whisky, found in the home is in the sole possession of the hus.
band may be rebutted by proof that the wife was exercising.joint or
individual possession of the whisky. Interestingly enough, the de-
fendant wife in that case some years before had won a reversal of a
conviction on- the identical point of her possession of whisky in a
Similar dase, although involving a different husband.18
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
As usual, many of the questions of criminal procedure, as well as
evidence questions, which arose during the survey period are dealt
with in the article on Procedure and Evidence.19 Some comment,
however, is made below of cases so considered.
Criminal contempt: Some general statements as to the applicability
6f criminal procedures and the rights of defendants in criminal con-,
tempt proceedings were made in Davidson County v. Randall.
20
Arrest: In cases in which items of real evidence are critical to the
proof it is frequently contended, sometimes apparently only hopefully,
that the evidence, is inadmissible as being the product of an unlaw-
ful search following an unlawful arrest. Because of the nature of the
cases, this is particularly true in liquor violations involving the il-
legal possession or transportation of liquor. Such a case was McBride
v. State,21 in which it appeared that police officers, after receiving ad-
vance information that- the defendant was transporting liquor illegally,
attempted to stop the defendant's car on a highway. The defendant
evaded apprehension; and the police gave chase, eventually capturing
the defendant in, a cul-de-sac, where he was immediately arrested for
reckless driving. A quantity of liquor was perceived on the rear floor
of the car, and an additional quantity was later found in the car's
trunk. Evidence as to the liquor taken from the trunk was excluded
at the trial for an unstated reason,z2 but the defendant was convicted.of
transporting illegally on the basis of evidence as to the liquor seized
from the rear floor. On appeal the Supreme Court held that the arrest
for reckless. driving was legal and the accompanying search, as far as.
looking into the automobile to see the liquor, was not unreasonable.
- In Herrington v. State2 3 police officers, after receiving general infor-
mation that the defendant was illegally transporting liquor, stopped
18 Lea'v. State, 181 Tenn. 378, 181 S.W.2d' 351 (1944); Lea v." State, 182
Tenn. 45, 184 S.W.2d 162 (1945).
S19'. Morgan, Procedure and'Evidence-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAVD. L.
REV. 1144 (1957).
20. 300 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. 1957).
21. 290 S.W.2d 648 (Tenn. 1956).
22. See Simmons v. State, 198 Tenn. 587,'281" S.W.2d 487 (1955);, Earle,
Criminal Law and Procedure-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VAND. L. REV. 980,
983 (1956).
23. 291 S.W.2d 587 (Tenn. 1956).
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'the defendant's car and inspected his operator's license. The defendant
then voluntarily agreed to a search, which disclosed a quantity of
,liquor in the car. Although asserted, no question of unlawful, search
'was present.
Warrant: The fact that the affidavit on which a search warrant was
iss u,ed was not dated does not invalidate the warrant where the
affidavit itself shows probable cause for the issuance.24 This is to be
(dstinguished from the case23 in which the affidavit does not allege
.the date of the offense.
Indictment:26 In Huffman v. State27 the indictment charged that the
defendants, jointly, "did unlawfully, wilfully, maliciously and feloni-19usly make an assault ... with an automobile ... [by driving] an
automobile into and against a vehicle occupied by [naming the occu-
pants] ... with wilful, malicious and felonious intent to maim and
injure ..... ": This, the court said, merely charged the offense of battery.
The trial court, however, charged the jury on the basis of an assault
with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter as an included offense
under section 39-604 of the Tennessee Code Annotated and the jury
convicted on that basis. Although a conviction for an offense greater
than that charged in the indictment could not be affirmed, the court
foud that the defendant was clearly guilty of battery and, on the basis
of Corlew v. State,2 a verdict of guilty of battery would be entered by
the. court and the case remanded for the fixing of a sentence by a jury.
In Wilson v. State29 an indictment for theft of "rass rollers" was
held to have been properly quashed where the proof showed the items
to be "bronze rollers."
Jurisdiction and Venue: The jurisdiction of a state to conduct crimi-
nal proceedings against a person who is serving a sentence of proba-
tion awarded by a federal court was involved in a habeas corpus peti-
tion brought in federal district court in Eaves v. Edwards.30 The court
there found that the overwhelming weight of federal authority was
to the effect that such jurisdiction exists, the exercise of which juris-
diction is a matter of comity between the two sovereigns and may not
be raised by the prisoner. The 1955 amendment to section 57-138 of
the Tennessee Code Annotated, which exempts from criminality the
transportation of liquor in a "wet" county, was involved in Chadwick
v. State3' in which it was held that one who was arrested and charged
24. State v. Odom, 292 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1956).
25. E.g., Welchance v. State, 173 Tenn. 26, 114 S.W.2d 781 (1938).
26. See the comment on Jones v. State, supra p ......
27. 292 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1956).
28. 181 Tenn. 220, 180 S.W.2d 901 (1944). See also State v. Odom, 292 S.W.2d
23 (Tenn. 1956).
29. 292 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1956).
30. 143'F. Supp. 229 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
31. 296 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1956). ,
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with illegally transporting whisky in a "wet" county could not be
tried in that county. The rationale of the decision is that no crime was
committed in the "wet" county and that there could be no venue
without consent in that county for the trial of a crime which may have
been committed in adjacent "dry" counties.
Former Jeopardy: In the "brass-bronze" case mentioned above
32
the court held that the quashing of the indictment for the theft of
brass rollers was not a bar to trial for the theft of bronze rollers and
that the question of former jeopardy was for the court and not the
jury.
Juries: There is no constitutional requirement that the same jury
which finds the guilt of an accused must fix his punishment, and thus
a case in which the appellate court has modified the verdict may be
returned to a different jury to assess the new punishment.33 In Nelson
v. StateA it was held that prospective jurors for the trial of a crime
arising out of a labor dispute are not per se disqualified because of their
membership in a labor union having no connection with the case.
Instructions: The effect of the Harmless Error Statute5 on errors
committed in instructing the jury was involved in two cases. In Black
v. State36 the jury asked the trial judge for additional instructions on
the definition of "malice" in a homicide case. The judge answered the
request orally, contrary to the provisions of section 40-2516 of the
Tennessee Code Annotated, which requires the charge in all felony
cases to be in writing. The error was held not to be "harmless" in this
case because of its possible effect on the verdict of the jury in finding
guilt of second degree murder rather than voluntary manslaughter.
In Dykes v. State,37 decided the same day, the error complained of
was the failure to charge the jury that they were the sole judges of
the law as well as the facts.3 It was held there that the error violated
a constitutional right of the defendant and was therefore not "harm-
less."
Judgment: The Criminal Court of Montgomery County being a court
of general, as distinguished from special, jurisdiction, its judgment in
a criminal case is subject to collateral attack only on the basis of an
error appearing on the face of the record. Such a judgment may not,
therefore, be attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding on the ground
that the defendant was under the age of eighteen at the time of render-
32. Wilson v. State, 292 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1956).
33. Huffman v. State, 292 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1956).
34. 292 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1956).
35. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-117 (1956).
36. 296 S.W.2d 833 (Tenn. 1956).
37. 296 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1596).
38. See the comments on this case in Morgan, Procedure and Evidence-
1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REV. 1144, 1165 (1957).
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ing the judgment and thus subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
juvenile court, where the age does not appear on the face of the
record.39
Counsel: State ex rel. Melton v. Bomar4° dealt with the right of a
defendant in a joint trial to have separate counsel appointed where his
defense was in conflict with the defense of other defendants, although
this was found to be inapplicable in that case. The right to appointed
counsel on appeal was considered in State ex rel. Fisher v. Bomar.
41
The court held that there is no such right.
Appeal: The appeal of a judgment of a juvenile court is, under the
statute,42 to the circuit court. The Supreme Court thus does not have
jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal.43 In State v. Odom4 the court
refers to the availability to the state of a petition for certiorari in a
criminal case to obtain a review of action by a trial court alleged to
be illegal or in excess of jurisdiction. This is in addition to the appeal
allowed by section 40-3401 of the Tennessee Code Annotated in crimi-
nal cases in which there was a conviction. An extension to the initial
period granted for the filing of a bill of exceptions must be made by
the trial court within the initial period in order to be effective.45
Sentences: The trial court's jurisdiction of a case under a suspension
of sentence is continued by the statute46 for a period of twelve months.
If notice of a proceeding for the revocation of the suspension is served
within that period, jurisdiction over the sentence is retained by the
court even though the actual proceedings may be had more than
twelve months after the entry of the suspension and the notice itself
may be amended after the twelve months' period to make more specific
the derelictions charged.47 In Hooper v. State4 it was also stated that
the required notice of proceedings to revoke a suspension of sentence
need not be construed as strictly as an indictment and proof of derelic-
tions related to that given in the notice, although not specified, may be
received.
RECENT LEGISLATION
A number of the acts of the 1957 Tennessee Legislature have some
effect on criminal law or procedure. These are summarized below.
Chapter references, unless otherwise indicated, are to the Tennessee
Public Acts, 1957.
39. Bomar v. State ex rel. Stewart, 300 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. 1957).
40. 300 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. 1957).
41. 300 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. 1957).
42. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 315, § 1, TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-273 (Supp. 1957).
43. Norrod v. State, 300 S.W.2d 926 (Tenn. 1957).
44. 292 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1956).
45. Duboise v. State, 290 S.W.2d 646 (Tenn. 1956).
46. TENN. CODE AN. § 40-2906 (1956).
47. McGuire v. State, 292 S.W.2d 190 (Tenn. 1956).
48. 297 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn. 1956).
1957] 1079
VANDERBZLT LAW REVIEW
Chapter 4549 defines and regulates the sale and use of fireworks,
making a violation punishable as a misdemeanor.
Chapter 82 adds50 as grounds for the making of an arrest by an
,officer without a warrant that the.person arrested "is attempting to
commit suicide."
Chapter 85 amends the sections of the criminal code dealing with
malicious injury or destruction of property with explosives5 l and
adds to the code provisions dealing with the illegal possession or trans-
portation of explosives, making such possession or transportation a
felony.
Chapter 94 amends section 51-436 of the Tennessee Code Annotated
regulating the taking, transporting or sale of minnows for bait.
Chapter 10452 defines and makes unlawful the crime of barratry.
Barratry is defined as "stirring up litigation"; "stirring up litigation"
is defined as "instigating or attempting to instigate a person or persons
to institute a suit at law or equity"; and "instigating" is defined as
"bringing it about that all or part of the expenses of the litigation are
paid by the barrator or ... persons ... acting in concert with" him.
There are a number of exceptions and exemptions to the statute.
Corporations, especially foreign corporations, are singled out for spe-
cial penalties. In general, statutory barratry appears to be a hybrid of
common law maintenance and barratry.
53
Chapter 113 amends section 33-624 of the Tennessee Code Annotated
by raising to a felony the doing of certain acts in connection with, inter
alia, the escape of, or knowing sale of certain articles to, an inmate of
a state mental hospital. Thus one who, while visiting his relative in
a state hospital, gives him a cigarette without the permission of the
institution's superintendent is subject to imprisonment in the state
penitentiary for one to three years!
Chapter 124- defines and provides punishment for the crime of
"shoplifting." This differs from larceny55 in that the crime of shop-
lifting is complete upon the taking of goods with intent to convert and
there is no requirement under the statute of a "carrying away." The
statute also raises certain presumptions from the possession of goods
in a store. Chapter 16456 provides certain immunities for the police
officer or merchant who takes into custody or detains a person when
there is probable cause for believing that the one detained has com-
mitted shoplifting.
49. TENN. CODE AwN. §§ 53-3001 to -3005 (Supp. 1957).
50. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-803 (Supp. 1957).
51. TEN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-1405 to -1410 (Supp. 1957).
52. TENN. CODE AM. §§ 39-3405 to -3410 (Supp. 1957), formerly id. § 39-3212
(1956).
53. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 448-54 (1957).
54. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4235 to -4236 (Supp. 1957).
55. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4202 (1956).
56. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-824 to -826 (Supp. 1957).
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Chapter 21557 makes it unlawfiii to intercept and retransmit radio,
telephone, or telegraph communications transmitted by law enforce-
ment agencies.
S'Chapte 262,5a repealing a simila, 1955 act, requires new refrigerators
for sale to he equipped with 'certain safety devices and provides 'a
petialty for violation:
Chapter 28859 defines "sex offenders" and provides for their com-
mitment and treatment as mentally ill persons. The statute provides
that such offenders (an actual "offense" apparently is not necessary to
make one subject to the act as long as there is a course of misconduct
in sexual matters evidencing a lack of control of sexual impulses) may
be retained in institutions until pronounced cured. See also chapter
353 with reference to parole of sex offenders.
Chapter 301 amends section 39-4203 of the Tennessee Code Anno-
tated s0"as ' to raise the distinction between grand and petty larceny
from $60 to $100 as to the value of goods stolen.
Chapter 332 amends section 39-1910 of the Tennessee Code Anno-
tated concerning untrue, deceptive' or misleading advertising. It is
made clear by the amendment that radio and television advertising are
subject to the statutes and that employment and loans, among other
things, are among the subjects of false advertising.
Chapter 36060 provides punishment for the making of lewd, obscene
or lascivious remarks or proposals by telephone. Chapter 39461 pun-
ishes certain types of fortunetelling in counties with populations over
400,000.
Chapter 40462 makes it a misdemeanor for any owner, operator or
manager of any place of business to allow the playing of pin-ball
games and similar devices by persons under the age of eighteen.
Ignorance, on the part of the person'in charge of the location of the
games, of the age of the player is stated to be no excuse for a violation.
Chapter 41063 is the Unfair Trade Practice and Advertising Act, relat-
ing to the household furniture and appliance business. The act appar-
ently is directed primarily at pseudo-wholesalers. Chapter 4116 pro-
vides regulations regarding the keeping of records by dealers in used
automobile parts.
57. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3111 to -3114 (Supp. 1957).
58. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2213 (Supp. 1957), as amended by Tenn. Pub. Acts,
1957, c. 262, §§ 1-2.
59. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-1301 to -1305 (Supp. 1957).
60. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3002 (Supp. 1957).
61. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1946 (Supp. 1957).
62. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-1008 to -1010 (Supp. 1957).
63. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 69-601 to-607,(Supp. 1957).
64. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1404 to 71407 (Supp. 1957).
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